

Message Text

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ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01
A-01 MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
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NSC-05 TRSY-02 USIA-06 /102 W
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R 311415Z MAR 77

FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7195

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USCINCEUR

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NAIROBI 4101

CINCEUR AND CINCPAC FOR POLADS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, KE

SUBJ: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: CERP 0001

1. HERewith PART I OF SUBJECT ASSESSMENT. PARTS II AND
III WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. U.S. INTERESTS:

-- IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT, I BELIEVE OUR PRIMARY
INTEREST IN KENYA IS TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE THE INFLUENCE
IT CAN EXERT IN INTERNATIONAL (ESPECIALLY AFRICAN) AFFAIRS
AS A POLITICALLY MODERATE AND ECONOMICALLY VIABLE DEVELOPING
COUNTRY. KENYA IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AS A STABILIZING
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FACTOR AMID INTERNAL TURMOIL AND INTER-STATE FRICTIONS IN
NEIGHBORING EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

-- OUR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC INTEREST IN KENYA IS NAVAL
ACCESS. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THIS INTEREST WILL
DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS WE ACHIEVE IN REACHING
AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS ON MUTUAL MILITARY RESTRAINT

IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK (I.E., FOR FY-79) IS FOR AN INCREASED NEED TO UTILIZE MOMBASA PORT FOR REFUELING AND REPROVISIONING U.S. NAVAL SHIPS, ASSUMING THAT USN MIDDLE EAST FORCE IS DE-HOMEPORTED AT BAHRAIN AND CONTINUED INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL PRESENCE IS DEEMED NECESSARY. ANOTHER ACCESS INTEREST IS CONTINUED KENYAN WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW TRANSIT OF NAVY P-3 PATROL FLIGHTS; THESE FLIGHTS COULD ASSUME GREATER IMPORTANCE FOR SURFACE SHIPPING SURVEILLANCE IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- OUR ECONOMIC AND CITIZEN INTERESTS IN KENYA ARE SUBSTANTIAL FOR A COUNTRY OF ITS SIZE AND LOCATION. BECAUSE OF ITS PRAGMATIC AND WESTERN-ORIENTED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND ITS QUITE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE TO DATE, KENYA OFFERS A VISIBLE MODEL OF AN LDC WHICH IS ADDRESSING ITS DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES WITH SOME DEGREE OF SUCCESS. NAIROBI IS THE LOGICAL AND PREFERRED REGIONAL CENTER FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND PRIVATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN AFRICA (AND IN MANY CASES THE ENTIRE CONTINENT). WE COULD DO WITHOUT IT, AS WE HAVE DONE WITHOUT FACILITIES FORMERLY OFFERED IN BEIRUT, BUT ALTERNATIVES WOULD COST MORE AND EFFICIENCY WOULD BE IMPAIRED. CURRENT VALUE OF U.S. PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN KENYA IS APPROXIMATELY \$200 MILLION; ANNUAL TWO-WAY TRADE IS \$105 MILLION WITH A BALANCE IN OUR FAVOR OF \$19 MILLION; THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 5,000 U.S. CITIZENS RESIDENT IN KENYA.

3. OVERVIEW: THE ODDS ARE THAT BY FY-79, PRESIDENT
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KENYATTA WILL NO LONGER BE IN OFFICE (HE IS IN HIS MID-EIGHTIES). IT IS FASHIONABLE TO ASK WHETHER KENYA CAN OVERCOME TRIBAL AND PERSONAL RIVALRIES WITHOUT HIS STEADYING HAND OF AUTHORITY AT THE TOP. MY JUDGMENT IS THAT KENYANS HAVE ENOUGH POLITICAL MATURITY, ENOUGH EXPERIENCE IN FORGING COALITIONS AND STRIKING COMPROMISES, TO ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO A POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT BUILT AROUND MULTIPLE CENTERS OF POWER RATHER THAN A SINGLE PATRIARCHAL FIGURE. THUS I HAVE CONFIDENCE IN KENYA'S INTERNAL COHESION.

-- KENYATTA'S SUCCESSORS WILL PROBABLY PROVE SLIGHTLY LESS CONSERVATIVE IN EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS; FOR EXAMPLE, THEY MAY EASE KENYATTA'S ARMS-LENGTH TREATMENT OF THE SOVIETS. BUT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO ALTER KENYA'S BASICALLY PRO-WESTERN BRAND OF NON-ALIGNMENT. IF WE ARE CAREFUL NOT TO OVEREXTEND OUR GOVERNMENTAL OR MILITARY PRESENCE IN KENYA, THEREBY INVITING EVENTUAL COUNTERREACTION, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO ENJOY CONTINUED NAVAL ACCESS AND HOSPITABLE CLIMATE FOR OUR INVESTORS, BILATERAL AND REGIONAL ACTIVITIES.

-- MY EXPECTATION OF A CONTINUED MODERATE EXTERNAL STANCE BY KENYA IS PREDICATED ON THE BELIEF THAT KENYAN SOCIETY WILL NOT CHANGE RADICALLY. THIS ASSUMPTION IS PLAUSIBLE SO LONG AS INTERNAL SOURCES OF DISCONTENT DO NOT GET OUT OF HAND. THE TWO MAJOR CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON IN THE NEXT DECADE ARE INTER-RELATED PROBLEMS OF GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT AND INCREASING POPULATION PRESSURES ON LAND AND FOOD PRODUCTION. WE NEED TO ADDRESS THESE TWO PROBLEMS, BUT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO PLAY DECISIVE ROLE IN SHAPING THE IMMEDIATE POST-KENYATTA GOVERNMENT.

-- I HAVE CAUTIONED AGAINST ALLOWING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH KENYA TO PLACE US IN TOO DOMINATING A POSITION, FOR FEAR OF POSSIBLE INTERNAL BACKLASH. THERE IS A RISK OF A DIFFERENT SORT -- THAT KENYA WILL COME TO RELY TOO HEAVILY ON THE U.S. FOR ITS OWN EXTERNAL SECURITY. IT IS QUITE CONFIDENTIAL

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POSSIBLE THAT KENYA WILL IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS ASK TO BUY (ON CREDIT) FURTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE U.S.; APART FROM THE IMPACT OF SUCH SALES ON REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCE, WE MUST ASK OURSELVES WHETHER THE EFFECT OF PROVIDING IT WILL BE TO STRENGTHEN KENYA'S SELF-RELIANCE OR TO HEIGHTEN ITS DEPENDENCE ON US IN A CRISIS. AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET INFLUENCE IN COUNTRIES ON KENYA'S PERIPHERY PROMISES TO INCREASE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, AND WE CLEARLY HAVE AN INTEREST IN KENYA'S WILL AND CAPABILITY TO STAND FIRM AGAINST POTENTIAL EXTERNAL THREATS, JUST AS WE ENCOURAGE GOK TO CONTINUE TO ADDRESS ADEQUATELY ITS INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. I FEEL, THEREFORE, THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR US TO CONTINUE A MEASURED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, WITH EMPHASIS ON SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES WITH OTHER WESTERN SUPPLIERS AS AT PRESENT.

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-----311543Z 097389 /43

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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

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AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NAIROBI 4101

CINCEUR AND CINCPAC FOR POLADS

-- THE CLIMATE FOR OUR INFORMATION OR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN KENYA SHOULD REMAIN FUNDAMENTALLY UNCHANGED OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. I BELIEVE KENYA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A FREE PRESS, THAT IT WILL WELCOME EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES WITH US, AND THAT ITS MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THIS AN ATTRACTIVE COUNTRY FOR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE, AS WELL AS PRIVATE INVESTMENT.

4. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES:

A. A POLITICALLY STABLE KENYAN GOVERNMENT WHICH CONTINUES TO BE HOSPITABLE TO OUR PRESENCE AND RECEPTIVE TO OUR PROPOSALS. THE KENYANS THEMSELVES HAVE LAUNCHED A POLITICAL PROCESS (KANU ELECTIONS) WHICH SHOULD ENHANCE THE PROSPECT OF A STABLE TRANSITION. THE CONTENDERS FOR POWER AFTER
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KENYATTA APPEAR TO BE WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS US; OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF POLITICAL FIGURES BUT TO AVOID BECOMING IDENTIFIED AS A SUPPORTER OF ONE OR ANOTHER FACTION.

B. MAINTENANCE OF KENYA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AGAINST PRESSURES FROM STATES IN THE AREA SUPPORTED BY MOSCOW AND ITS FRIENDS. WE HAVE ALREADY CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OBJECTIVE BY AGREEING TO SUPPLY A SQUADRON OF F-5E/F AIRCRAFT TO KENYA FOR ITS DEFENSE AGAINST POTENTIAL SOMALI OR UGANDAN THREATS, AND BY DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT INCLUDING A NAVAL SHOW OF FORCE IN RESPONSE TO UGANDAN THREATS FOLLOWING THE JULY 1976 ENTEBBE CRISIS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO OFFER MILITARY TRAINING AND GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO ANY FURTHER KENYA REQUESTS FOR

MILITARY EQUIPMENT. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND IN RESPONDING TO ANY REALIGNMENT OF SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA THAT KENYA REGARDS SOMALI IRREDENTISM AS ITS PRIMARY LONG-TERM EXTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM. WE SHOULD GIVE OUR DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO EFFORTS TO AVOID CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.

C. CONTINUED NAVAL ACCESS TO KENYA. WE SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID COMPROMISING KENYA'S FORMAL POSITION OF NON-ALIGNMENT BY KEEPING THE VISIBILITY OF OUR NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO A MINIMUM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO BE HELPFUL TO KENYA'S OWN ARMED FORCES, E.G., THROUGH CONDUCTING NAVAL EXERCISES WITH THEM AND SHARING INTELLIGENCE ABOUT AREAS OF CONCERN TO THEM. ISSUE: CAN WE ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES IN PARAGRAPHS B AND C WITHOUT ASSUMING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, A SECURITY COMMITMENT TO KENYA WHICH WE ARE UNPREPARED TO FULFILL?

D. ACHIEVEMENT OF KENYA'S DEVELOPMENT GOALS. USAID SHOULD INCREASE BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDING TO THE EXTENT KENYA CAN ABSORB IT, AND WE SHOULD SUPPORT SIMILAR INCREASES IN WELL-CONCEIVED MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE. IN BALANCING KENYA'S CONFIDENTIAL

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NEEDS AGAINST THOSE OF OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT KENYA IS PREDOMINANTLY A NATION OF POOR PEOPLE, WHO EARN THEIR LIVING FROM THE LAND, DESPITE KENYA'S SOMEWHAT MORE SOPHISTICATED ECONOMY AS COMPARED TO MANY OTHER AFRICAN LDC'S. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT WILL ADD SUBSTANTIALLY TO EMPLOYMENT. WE SHOULD SEEK AN IMPROVEMENT OF PER-CAPITA ECONOMIC GROWTH BY VIGOROUS EFFORTS TO REDUCE KENYA'S 3.5 PER CENT ANNUAL POPULATION INCREASE.

E. STRENGTHENING BONDS BETWEEN PEOPLES OF U.S. AND KENYA. INFORMATION PROGRAMS, EXCHANGES OF PERSONS, SELF-HELP PROJECTS AND AN ACTIVE PEACE CORPS PROGRAM SHOULD ALL BE PURSUED. ISSUE: HISTORICALLY MOST KENYAN STUDENTS IN U.S. HAVE HELPED SUPPORT THEMSELVES BY WORKING. CAN WE FIND A MEANS OF ALLOWING THEM TO CONTINUE DOING SO?

F. PROMOTION OF SUPPORTIVE KENYAN ATTITUDE ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, INCLUDING MULTILATERAL QUESTIONS. WE SHOULD CONSULT KENYA ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN AND HORN OF AFRICA ISSUES, EVEN IF WE BELIEVE THEIR INFLUENCE IS NOT IMMEDIATELY USEFUL. WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO TAILOR OUR POSITIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN WAYS THAT WILL AVOID FORCING KENYA TO CHOOSE BETWEEN AN OAU OR G-77 POSITION AND OUR OWN. WE SHOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH KENYAN OFFICIALS IN NAIROBI AND ELSEWHERE ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO KENYA, E.G., LOS, COFFEE, ENVIRONMENT.

MARSHALL

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Message Attributes

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